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ABSTRACT

The initial forecastinQ of lOQistical suoport for
new types of military aircraft is a perplexing problem .
The

objectiv~

of this research was to

inv~stigate

the

feasibility of using data generated by the accelerated
fliqht tests as a basis for forecasting the logistical
field requirements.

The data used in the study were

obtained from the U . s. Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker,
Alabama, where

perfo~ance

t~sts

are conducted on all

new aircraft to determine their suitability for Army

use.

It

w~s

statistically shown

t~at

the use of these

data could orovide more realistic loqlstical forecasts
~arli~r

in the introductory phase of the aircraft.

concp-ct would

increas~

the

oper~tlonal

av~ilability

the aircraft and reduce the cost of maintaining the

aircraft durina its introductorv phase.

This
of

•
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C~P~RI

Introduction
The Forecasting Concept
Logistics is the branch of military science that
deals with all aspects of procurement, movement, mainte-

nance, and disposition of supplies, equipment, facilities,
and

p~rsonnel,

and the provision of services.

Maintenance and supply of aircraft components and
repair parts are the two aspects of logistics that principally affect military aircraft operations.

The supply

of the required repair parts and replacement components
in the required quantities at the required location is a
basic problem and one of utmost importance in the day-today operation of the military aircraft fleet.
In an attempt to solve thi s basic supply problem,
forecasts, based on the expected usage rates in conjunc-

tion with the yearly proposed flying-hour program, are
made of the requirements for aircraft repair parts.

The

effectiveness of the supply system depends to a great
extent on the validity of the usage rate factors -- the
basis of forecasting.
The forecasting role in military aircraft logistics
expanded dramatically durinq day-to-day operations in

2
Vietnam.

Many excellent techniques in forecasting the

requirements for military aircraft replacement parts and
dynamic components have been developed or have evolved
throuqh the years, but most of these techniques are based
on cumulative field data.

This is an effective tool and

decisive step forward where operational data is available.

However, introduction of new military aircraft

presents special forecasting problems because adequate
operatinq experience is not yet available to provide a
r~alistic

basis for

for~castinq

requirements.

As a

consequence, there has often been a rather loose assortm~nt

of techniques used:

lists provided by the manu-

facturer and military prepared lists based on operating
experience qained from similar types of aircraft.

Expe-

rience has proven this to be an unrealistic approach
to reliable forecasting.
The proposed forecasting concept to be explored in
this report is an outgrowth of personal experience in the
testinq and maintenance of military rotary-wing aircraft
and is an attempt to provide an accelerated means for more
accurate forecastinq of replacement components and repair

parts durinq the new aircraft initial operating period.

Background
Th~

acquisition of new aircraft by the U.S. Army

can be accomplished in several ways -- from purchase of
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an existinq civilian model to financing the development
o~

a unique model.

mod~l

The introductory phase of a unique

constitutes the qreatest cha11enqe to the logis-

tical forecaster.

When the Department of Army contracts

for the development of aircraft, it specifies a re1iability requirement.

This requirement may range from

a simple statement of system reliability goals to a
requirement for contractor demonstration of achievement.
Many aircraft dynamic components, however, have time
before overhaul (TBO) reliability requirements which
encompass an extended period of f1iqht time and are
aenera11y never demonstrated prior to the procurement
of aircraft in production quantities.

This was espe-

cially true during the buildup in Army aircraft between
1965 and 1970,

wh~n

the Army introduced more than 5 new

types of aircraft in substantial numbers.

Activities Provi d ing the Data Base for
Proposed Forecasting Concept
To determine operational suitability and to establish time between overhaul for the dynamic components of
newly introduced aircraft, the U.S. Army Aviation Test
Board, Fort Rucker, Alabama conducts accelerated flight
test programs.

These tests are conducted by flying the

aircraft at hiah gross weiahts while uti1izinq flight
pro~il~s

which represent typical missions the aircraft
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will experience in field operations.
thes~
~cr

Data derived from

tests are used to establish time before overhaul

dynamic

compon~nts

and to identify those components

requiring product improvement programs (PIP) to correct
deficiencies.

During these tests a monthly flight time

averaging 150 to 200 hours per aircraft is accumulated.
This is approximately 7 times greater than the normal
flight time accumulated by aircraft assigned to field
operation.
While these tests provide a relatively small sample,
limited to 2 or 3 aircraft, it is hypothesized that the
data aenerated by these flight tests could be used to
initially forecast loaistical requirements for repair
parts, replaceable components, and engine overhauls for

the

o~ratina

fleet, thus establishinq a logical hasis

for a logistical forecasting concept.

This would, seem-

ingly, provide a more timely and realistic logistical
forecast of the new aircraft system's requirements and

alleviate many of the costly supply shortages that generally occur during the introductory phase.

Also, it would

greatly increase the operating fleet's effectiveness during the introductory period.
The concept of using such a small sample as a basis
for a loaistical forecasting method is only valid if the
sample can be shown to be truly representative of the operatlnq

fl~p.t.

However, if the concept can be validated,
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the present practice of waiting for actual field experience to provide a reliable basis for forecasting could be
modified to utilize the test data as an interim basis.
thereby greatly reducing the time lag in identifying
changes in requirements.
A pertinent example of events that sometimes occurs
during accelerated flight testing might serve to illus t rate the importance of this concept.

A major component

with a proposed time before overhaul life of 1200 hours
contains a design deficiency resulting in its removal for
overhaul at only 450 flight hours.

A Product Improvement

Program (PIP) based on the data generated by the accelerated flight test program is started immediatelY1 however.
the logistical supply system continues to procure and
stOCK the component at a rate based on an expected usage
factor of 1200 hours before overhaul.

Meanwhile. the

inadequately designed component continues to be installed
in new production aircraft until the PIP provides a way
to correct the deficiency and to institute an engineering
change in production of the component.

However. immedi-

ately on discovery of an inadequately designed component.
logistical plannina needs to be updated in order to prevent serious shortages in the supply system.
Logistical planning for an increase in the usage of
most major dynamic components such as engines and transmissions can not be readily achieved due to very long

6

manufacturing lead times, plus any change increasing
their production rate will adversely affect program costs.
It 1s ironic, but true, that logistical plannlnQ by suppliers often has a qreater effect on the introduction
and acceptance of a new aircraft by the uslnq unite than

thp ability of the aircraft to

perfo~

its assiqned mls-

sion.
Specific oojectlves of these accelerated fl1qht test
proqrams

fOT

Army helicopters at the Fort Rucker facility

were:
a) to determine time between overhaul for dynamic

components,
b) to identify desiqn deficiencies which affect
reliability,
c) to cheCk adequacy of product improvements, and

d) to determine

o~ratinq

costs (petroleum, 011,

lubricants) •
Durinq th"'se accelerated flights,

the testinq was

completely controlled by the use of flight profiles which
si~ulated

as closely as possible the missions to be flown

by the regular fleet.

The profiles were scheduled and

flown oroportionately throughout the test period.

Each

pilot was briefed prior to each flight on the profile he
was to fly and debriefed following the flight to assure
that the profile had been flown and to record his comments on thp. aircraft's performance.
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A typical flight profile for a light cargo, rotarywinq aircraft was.
PROFILe #--

Tactical Transport Mission.

The air-

craft will takeoff at maximum allowable gross weight.
Each fliqht is scheduled for a three-hour period.

Air-

craft will be refu1ed every hour to bring it back up to
the maximum allowable gross weight.

Cruising flight

throuqhout each period will be at an indicated altitude
of 800 feet and at 90 knots indicated air speed.

Four

consecutive normal to steep approaches to a hover are to
be performed each hour utilizing barriers.

Each approach

will begin at an altitude of 800 feet, and two of these
approaches will be made down wind when surface winds are
less than 15 knots.

This profile shall account for 50

percent of this accelerated fliqht test program.

Research Objective
The objective of this research is to determine the
validity of usinq accelerated flight test data to calculate usage rates for aircraft repair parts, replaceable
components, and engines in order to establish a basis for
forecasting future requirements for these items.

Significance Tests and Level of Confidence
In order to determine the validity of the proposed
forecastinq concept, a series of comparison and
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statistical inference tests will be made utilizing data
generated by the accelerated flight test of two different
aircraft types and data qenerated over an extended pertod

of time by the same types of aircraft during fleet operations.

The validity of using accelerated flight data to

calculate usage rates will be considered substantiated
if all valid test samples can be shown to have met the
followinq statistical requirements!

a) the mean time between failures (M'mF) achieved
during accelerated testing is an unbiased estimator of
the MTBF experienced by the same component durino fleet

ooeration.
b) the use of the MTBF achieved during the tests to
predict fleet MTBF would not underestimate by more than
0.10 (a fiaure derived during discussions with Army Aviation loaisticians), with a statistical confidence of 0.90.
The null hypothesis Ho' XF - XT <: 0.1 XF will be
test ~ d

on a suitable t statistic which signifies the

level of confidence and 1s based on the following assumptions.

The failure rate 1s assumed constant even though

the sample size 1s small for each type component tested

durinq the accelerated test.

The distribution of failure

times is an exponential distribution for both the accelerated fliqht test and the fleet operation based on theory
developed in the article by B. Epstein listed in the
bibliooraphy.

In performing this test, it was assumed

9
th~t

the exponential model of failures holds for

compon~nt,

e~ch

and the variance for each sample is equal to

the sample mean.

It is also assumed that the sample

distribution in both
equal to variance.

c~ses

would be normal with mean

This should be conservative in the

field data case since it represents such a large sample,
nF

~

1000, and the variance would be very small.

Due to

the vast differences in sample size between accelerated
test data and fleet operation data, tests of the hypothesis that accelerated test usage rates would not overestimate fleet usage rates by more than 0.10 were based
on a one-side d test of the modified t statistic
t

with

deqr~es

=

(X F

-

XT )

-

O·1XF

SXF - X T

of freedom limited to nT to reduce the influ-

ence of fleet operation sample size.
where:

= mean

operat ~ ng time experienced during
fleet operations.

= mean operating time experienced during
accelerated flight test.
= number of samples in fleet operations data.

= number of samples in accelerated test data.

(nF-l)SF2 + (nT-l)ST 2
(n F +n -2)
T

modified to reduce the effect of the large sample size of
fleet operations.
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c) The degree of correlation between accelerated

test data and fleet ooeratlons data can be measured by
a nonparametr!c sum ratio test of the components respectlv~

mpans.

A value of unity would represent perfect

correlation: deviation from one, either plus or minus,
reduc~s

the dearee of correlation.

The sum ratio 1s

expressed by the follow ing equation:
n

r

L

=

n = 1

XT
XF

n

where:
n

~

total number of component types samoled.

In accordance with sian test theory, a correlation
interval of plus or minus 0.05 will slqnlty a statistical
confldpnce of 0.90 that the accelerated

t~St9

produced

Tp.PTPspntativp. samples. l

lIrwln Miller and John E. Freund, Probability and
Statistics for Enalneers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-H.ll, 1965), p. 212.
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CHAPTER II

Data Comparison for VB-I Aircraft

UB-l

~ircraft

Dur1nq thp.

Accelerated Fliqht Test Programs

o~riod

June 11, 1962 to November 2, 1963,

thp U.S. Army Aviation Test Board , Fort Rucker, Alabama

conducted a 1000-hour test of the proto-type YUH-1D to
determine and evaluate the UH-1D helicopter, with special
emphasis directed toward increasing service life of major
dynamic components.

After this evaluation was completed,

Department of the Army determined that a second set of
dynamic components should be evaluated Hto provide a
broader base of data until such time as information on
dynamic components is available from aircraft 1n the

operat1nQ fleet."
ducted

betw~en

February, 1963 and December,

which many CToduct

tested.

A second test of 1000 hours was con-

improvem~nt

19 64, during

proqram components were

Both of these tests were based on flight pro-

files involving a high percentage of fliqhts at normal
takeoff qross weights (6,600 - 7,800 pounds) and a very
low percentage of flights at the maximum gross weight
(8,600) •
11
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In the meantime, the OR-IO helicopters assiqned
to the operating fleet were being operated continuously
at or near the maximum takeoff gross weight, and these
operations were providing examples that showed continuous operation at high gross weights increased stress on
airframes and decreased life on all dynamic components.
In addItIon, a new 48-foot main-rotor system which would
increase
was

th~

maximum takeoff qross weight to 9,500 pounds

proqra~ed

to replace the 44-foot rotor system.

S1nep. procurement of DM-ID dynamic components and spare
parts was based on a component fatigue life calculated
for an aircraft oceratinq at a design takeoff qross
weiqht of 6,600 pounds and an IIOO-hour time between
overhaul of components, a third accelerated f1iqht test

of the UH-l was directed which would utilize an aircraft
with 48-foot rotor system, operate at high gross weights,
and maintain profiles which truly represented fleet
operations.

This test was conducted between February 10,

1965 and October 18, 1965 and consisted of an 1100-hour
fliqht proqram.

Flight Test Pesults
In addition to the enqlne, detailed data was
compiled for 12 airframe dynamiC components which were
subject to overhaul and had an assigned time before

overhaul life of 1100 hours.

The following compiled

90 0 GEARBOX
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lnforma~lon

1s an analysis of the engine and the airframe

dynamic components used during the third accelerated

fliqht test of the UH-l type aircraft which will be used
as a basis for forecasting usage data.

a) Engine Assembly, T52-l-ll, TBO life 1200 hours .
Three engines wp.re used during the test.
pnqine was removed at 253.1 hours.

The first

The second enqine

fal1p.o at 20.9 hours, and enqine number three had accu-

mulated 826.0 hours by the end of the test and was still
s~rvlc~able.

Mean operatinq time was 3n6.67 hours, with

a standard deviation of 19.15 hours.
b) Transmission Assembly, TBO life 1100 hours.
transmission assemblies were used during test.

Two

The first

transmission assembly was replaced at 598.9 hours.

The

second transmission had accumulated 501.1 hours at the

end of test.

Mean operating time was 550.0 hours, with

a standard deviation of 23.45 hours.
c) Ninety-Degree Gearbox Assembly, TBO life 1100
hours.

A total of five gO-degree gearboxes were utilized

durinq this test.
hours,

~2

Fliqht time per gearbox was:

- 18.5 hours,

#5 - 722.5 hours.

~3

#1 - 274

- 14.8 hours, #4 - 70.3 hours,

Cause of failures was accumulation of

metal particles in the oil.

Mean operating time during

test was 220.0 hours, with a standard deviation of 14.83
hours.
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d) Forty-two-Deqree Gearbox Assembly. TBO life 1100
hours.

Two 42-deqree qearboxes were utilized durinq test.

Gearbox #1 accumulated 292.2 hours and was damaaed by
pnainp.

sura~

nurinq

~nglne

failure.

Gearbox #2 had

accumulated 807.8 hours by the end of test and was still
operatinq satisfactorily.

Mean operatinq time was 550.0

hours, with standard deviation of 23.45 hours.

e) Main-Rotor Hub Assp.mbly. TBO life 1100 hours.
Two main-rotor hubs were used durinq the test.

Hub #1

had flown 674.5 hours when an inspection revealed damaged
retainer straps and corrosion inside the hub yokes.

The

second hub was installed and had operated 185.6 hours
when product improvement parts were incorporated.

It

then operated another 239.9 hours before the test ended.
Cons!derinq the introduction of PIP parts as a minor
oVPThaul,

m~an

oOPratinq time for this component was

366.67 hours. with standard deviation of 19.15 hours.
f) M~in-Rotor Ma~t Assembly. TeO life 1100 hours.

The same main-rotor mast assembly was used throughout
the test and final inspection revealed no unsatisfactory

condition.

As the main thrust bearing is retirement-

life limited to 1100 hours. mean operating time for this
one example was 1100 hours.

g) Scissors and Sleeve Assemb ly. TeO life 1100 hours.
Two sleeve assemblies were operated durinq

th~

test.

first was removed after 253.1 hours because of loose

The
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bearinqs.

The second sleeve assembly had accumulated

59.1 hours prior to being installed on the test aircraft.
After being installed on the test aircraft, it accumu-

lated an additional 846.9 hours for a total of 906 hours.
Mean operating time for sleeve assemblies was 579.55

hours, with standard deviation of 24.07 hours.
Several sets of scissors were

utl11~ed

during this

test to check out product improvement program ideas.
S1nc~

sclgsor~

bear ina problems can be detected and

replacement made at operating level, mean operating time

for scissors and sleeve assemblies is dependent only upon
the life of the sleeve assembly, which was 579.55 hours.
h) Swashplate and Support Assembly, TBO life 1100
hours.

one swashplate and support assembly was operated

during this test and accumulated 1100 hours.

Upon test

completion, overhaul of the swashplate revealed one of
four bearincrs in the swashplate and support ring had what
appeared to be corrosion on one of the balls.

ina was replaced.
lifp of 3300 hours.

The bear-

Swashplate has a calculated fatigue
Mean operating time for tested

swasholate and support

W~B

1100 hours.

i) Stabilizer Bar Assembly, TBO life 1100 hours.
The stabilizer bar assembly assumulated 1100 hours during
the test.

Inspection at the end of test disclosed that

the bearing in the end of the lever assembly was rough
and interfered with the smoothness of the lever's
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movement.

The mp.an operatlnq time for stabilizer bar

8ssembly was 1100 hours.
j) Driv~ Shaft Assembly, TBO life 1100 hours.

Four

drivp shaft assemblies were utilized during this test.
The first assembly accumulated 204.9 hours and was re-

moved because of excessively worn teeth.

The second

accumulated 48.2 hours and was removed because of damage
sustained when the helicopter struck tree limbs.

The

third 8ccumulated 699 hours during the test and, with
405 hours previous operatinq time, had a total accumu-

lated time of 1104 hours at
~ourth

t~e

time of removal.

The

assembly had accumulated Id7.9 hours by the end

of tp.stino.

Th~

m~an

operatinq time for drive shaft

assembly was 376.25 hours, with a standard deviation of

19.40 hours.
k) Tail-Rotor Hanger Assemblies, TBO life 1100
hours.

One set of tail-rotor hanqer assemblies was

operated 1100 hours during this test.

The mean oper-

atina time for this item was 1100 hours.
1) Tail-Rotor Control Quill, Condition Change Item.
The quill accumulated 1100 hours during the test.
~ean

The

operatlnq time for tail-rotor control quill was

1100 hours.
m) Tail-Potor Pitch-Chanqe Tubp, Condition Chanqe
Item.

The tube accumulated 1100 hours ourinq the test.

Mp.an operatinq time was 1100 hours.
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Table 1 is a summary of the results achieved in the
third accelerated flight test of OR-I aircraft:
TABLE 1
OR-I MAJOR COMPONENTS - FLIGHT TEST DATA
Average
Operating
TBO
Component
Hours
Engine

1200 hours

366,7 hours

Transmission

1100 hours

550,0 hours

90-d e qree Gearbox

1100 hours

220,0 hours

4 2 -deqre" Gearbox

1100 hours

550,0 hours

Hub, Main-Rotor

1100 hours

366,7 hours

1100 hours

1100,0 hours

Scissors and Sleeve

1100 hours

579,6 hours

Swashplate

1100 hours

1100 , 0 hours

Stabilizer Bar

1100 hours

1100,0 hours

Drive Shaft

1100 hours

376,3 hours

Hangers, Tail Rotor

1100 hours

1100,0 hours

Quill, Tail Rotor

CCl"

1100,0 hours

CCl"

1100,0 hours

Mast,

Tu~,

Main-Rotor

Tail Rotor

-Has been changed from TBO to condition change item.

Factors for Forecastinq Usage of OR-I
Aircraft Major Dynamic Components
The test results discussed above showed t h at in
addition to the enqlne, six of the major dynamic components eXpp'Tiencpd a mean operatlnQ

tlm~

which would tend
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to indicate that the usaqe rate of these items was higher
than planned.

The requirements for overhaul of components

and repair parts result directly from the operating fleet.
Knowina how many flight hours the fleet will be operated
and the usage of components per flight hour will allow
the loaistician to

for~cast

requirements.

A new usage

factor for enqines and each of the six components was
based on the mean operatlnq time and is shown 1n Table 2.

TABLE 2
UH-l MAJOR COMPONENTS - FLIGHT TEST USAGE RATE
Average
Operating
Usage Factor/
Flight Hour
Component
Hours
Engine

366.7 hours

0.002727

Transmission

550.0 hours

0.001818

Gearbox

220.0 hours

0.004545

42-dearp.e Gearbox

550.0 hours

0.001818

Hub, Main-Rotor

366.7 hours

0.002727

Scissors and Sleeve

579.6 hours

0.001725

Drive Shaft

376.3 hours

0.002658

90-deqn~e

Fleet Operations Data, UH-IH Helicopter
The fleet operating data contained in the U.S. Army
Aviation System Command Technical Report 75-3, titled
"Executive Summary Report, UH-lH Assessment and Comparatlve Fleet Evaluation," dated April, 1975 was used as a
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basis for determining the usage factors actually experienced in operating UH-l type aircraft.

This report con-

tains information on the use of TBO items by UH-l type
aircraft from October I, 1969 to May 21, 1974, a period
of 4

y~ars,

8 months.

The averaqe number of UH-l type

aircraft assiqned to the U.S. Army fleet during this
period varied, but the averaqe for the period covered

by fiscal years 72, 73, 74, and 75 was 3805 aircraft.
Th~

averaop aqe of the UH-l fleet on Oecembp.r 31, 1974

was 5 years, 8 months, with approximately 140 aircraft

lp.ss than 7 months old and with 5 aircraft more than 11
years, 3 months old.

The averagp. aircraft 1n the fleet

on December 31, 1974 had accumulated 2308 flight hours.
This included 250 aircraft with less than 300 flight
hours and 5 aircraft with over 5700 flight hours.

UH-IH Fleet Loaistical Requirements
An analysis of field operating costs showed that
durinq the period April, 1971 through March, 1972, the
cost per flight hour to operate a UH-IH helicopter was
~194.72.

Parts consumption accounted for $149.64 of

the total cost.

The average number of flight hours per

aircraft per month during this period was 36.3 hours.
The approximate cost for parts for one year was $65,185
per aircraft.

Usage factors based on fleet experience

was well established by this time.

The averaae operating
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hours at removal for parts that failed had stabilized and
fluctuations,

if any, were very small.

Utilizing the

averaqp operatlna hours at removal as a basts, a usaae
factor for enqines and each of the six previously ldentl-

fied components was calculated and is shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
UH-l MIIJOR COMPONENTS

Component

- FLEET USAG E RI\ TE

Frequency of
Replacement

Usage Factor /
Flight Hour

Enqine

360.5 hours

0.002774

Transmission

647.7 hours

0.001544

90-dearee Gearbox

471.1 hours

0.002123

42-dearee Gearbox

568.2 hours

0.001760

Hub, Main-Rotor

371.4 hours

0.002693

Scissors and Sleeve

649.8 hours

0.001539

Drive

274.2 hours

0.003647

Sha~t

Comparison of Usage Rates Based on Accelerated

Test Data with Fleet Usage Experience
Most of the methods of estimation and of testing
hypotheses are based on the assumption that the observations are taken from normal populations.

These methods

extract all the information that is available in a sample,
and they usually attain reliable results.

The assump-

tion that the samples provided by the accelerated flioht

22
c@sts wer@ truly representative of the fleet will be
confirmed by showing throuqh comparison of the usage
rate~

th~~

they aave reasonably accurate answers.

a) Engine Assembly, T53-L-ll.
enq1n~s

the

The usage rate for

dur1nq the accelerated test was 0.002727, and

U8aq~

~at@

0.002774, with

e~perienced

~F

by the fleet stabilized at

= 24,360.

The rate experienced by

t le~t o~ ~at1on is only a 1.7 percent increase in the
~at~

oredl ~t@d

i:<!at "

'j'o

;;:! ~ t

o pe£e:t 1 ..q t .l..i".a

a t . d c&',l J i:1c'
3

d,!q :L ~l!s

0~

"f

J1:

0.9t (wall

by the data from the accelerated flIght
",;'he hypothesis that component's ,nearl

valid predictor of flel!t usage rate,

:-IQ8

"l dS

calculated and found to be -2.22, "Wii:h

T "!'?-dorn,

~~ove

which indicates a

wher.:!aa t he

USllqe

per~ent

duri~q
~lad

in

~he

The usaqe rat;fD i"~r Ina i;'

during the accelerated test was 0.001818,
rate for the fleet reached

0.00DI4, "ith " F = 13,560.
a 15

Ie,.,el

minimum of 0.90).

"'u ) TraYio jTl1.~slon Assembly.
tran~mlo31~ns

confl v enc~

d

st l~ ady

The fleet rate ?epr"s"nts

reduction 1n the rate that was achieved

decelerated test.

Investigation showed there

been ,i'lore than 10 separate product improvements made
t~, a

Crandli'llss1on since the accelerated test, and these

improv~ments

orobably account for at least two-thirds of

the reduction in the usaqe rate experienced by the fleet.
The accelerated test data may have over-estimated thp.
us~qP

rate by 5 percent at the most.

A t statistic of
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+1.28 with 2 degrees of freedom indicates a confidence
level of 0.17, far below minimum of 0.9.

This is not a

valid sample due to changes 1n transmission deSign.

c) Ninety-degree Gearbox Assembly.

The 90-degree

gearbox had the highest usage rate of all dynamic components during the accelerated test - 0.004545.

The 90-

degree gearbox had a product improvement proqram under

way while the accelerated flight tes t was being conducted , and thp fifth aearbox to be installed during the
tpst was

~

product of that proqram.

I t had accumulated

722.5 hours by the end of the test.

A total of 6 engi-

np.erinq chanqes have been incorporated 1n the 90-deqree
qearbox, and the field usa g e rate h a s been reduced to

0.00 2123, with nF = 18,640 indicating a better than 50
percent reduction from accelerated flight test data.
However, a careful analysis of the test data indicates
one replacement was precautionary and another was proba-

bly due to lnf "lnt mortality, caused by improper run-in.
Utl11zinQ the remaining accelerated test samples as a
basis of data, the usage rate would have been 0.002B12.
The actual usaqe rate is 25 percent below what the acceleratp.d tp.st data would have forecast it to be.

Uslnq

only the samples considered valid, a t statistic of +3.18
with 3 deqrees of freedom indicates a confidence level of
0.025.

Sample is not considered valid due to chanqes in

design · of 90-degrep. gearbox.
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d)

Forty-two-degre~

Gearbox Assembly.

During the

accelerated test, the 42-degree gearbox had a usage rate

of 0.001818 per flight hour.

The fleet experienced a

usage rate of 0.001760 per flight hour, with nF = 15,456.
The usage rate experienced by the fleet is a mere 3 percent less than that predicted by the accelerated flight
test data.

T statistic for 42-degree gearbox is -1.63

with two deqrees of freedom, which indicates a confidence

level of 0.88.

Hypothesis is rejected.

e) Main-Rotor Hub Assembly.

The usage rate for

main-rotor hubs durinq the accelerated test was 0.002727
per flight hour.

Fleet operation has produced a usage

rate of 0.002693 per flight hour, with n F = 23,645.

The

usaqe rate experienced 1n fleet operations 1s only one
percent lower than that experienced during the test.
Calculations produced a t

statistic for the main-rotor

hub assembly of -1.68 with 3 degrees of freedom, signifyinq a conficence level of 0.90.
f) Scissors and Sleeve Assembly.

Durinq the accele-

rated test the scissors and sleeve assemblies had a usage

rate of 0,001725 per flight hour.
n~erinq

There were 4 engi-

changes 1n the sleeve assembly resulting from

the product

i~provement

proqram.

Utilizing assemblies

with these chanqes, the fleet established a usage rate

for scissors and sleeve assemblies of 0.001639 per flight
hour, with "F = 13,515.

,

The fleet rate is nearly eleven

25
percent less than predicted by the accelerated test data.
If only 50 percent of the reduction in usage was the
r~sult

of product improvp.ment, the accelerated test data

would still have overestimated fleet usage by 5 percent.
Calculat~d

t

statistic for scissors and sleeve assembly

is +0.20 with two degrees of freedom, giving a confidence
level of 0.35, which is well below the minimum of 0.90.
Hypothesis is not validated at acceptable level.
q) Drive Shaft Assembly.

The engine to transmission

drive shafts utilized during the accelerated test included
one shaft which had 405 hours of previously accumulated
flight time, and this time was utilized in arriving at the
mean operatinq time of 367.25 flight hours.

The operating

conditions under which these prior hours were accumulated
1s unknown, but an inspection made prior to installation

on the test aircraft showed this drive shaft to be serviceable.

nn inspection conducted on this particular

t:

drive shaft upon its reaching TBO life revealed that

several parts were severely damaged, and the assembly had

damaged the engine inner coupling internal spline.

If

only the time data accumulated during the accelerated
flight test is used, the mean operating time would be
275 flight hours, and the usage rate would be 0.003636
per flight hour.

The operating fleet has established a

usage rate for drive shaft assemblies of 0.003647 per
flight hour, which is only .3 percent greater than that
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pTPdicten by the test

d~ta.

Calcul~tions

for drive shaft

asspmhly produced a t statistic of -1.71 with 4 degrees
of freedom, signifying a confidence levp.l of 0.91, therefore, test data 1s considered valid.
The comparison of select dynamic components' u5age
rates durinq the fleet operations and the accelerated

test are sho·..m in Table 4.

TABL~

4

UH-1 MAJOR COMPOIlENTS -- USAGE RATE COMPARISON

Test Usage

Fleet Usage

Rate

Rate

~nqin~

0.002727

0.002774

Transmission

0.001818

0.001544

-15%·

90-d~ar@~

G""arbox

0.002812

0.002123

-25%·

42-degree Gearbox

0.001818

0.001760

-3%

Main-Rotor Hub

0.002727

0.002693

-1%

0.001725

0.001539

-10.8%·

0.003636

0.003647

.0.3%

Comoon~nt

Scissors and

Sleev~

Drive Shaft Assembly

Difference

.1. 7%

*Reductions dup. primarily to PIP program.

Tests confirmed the null hypothesis for all components which remain essentially unchanged, except for one

which had

con~idence

level of 0.88.

null hypothesis have the accelerated

These tests of the
tP.~t

data fal1inq

abovp the 0.90 confidence level for 75 percent of the
item~.

•

CHAPTER III
Data Comparison for OR-58 Aircraft

OH-58A Aircraft Accelerated
Flight Test Programs
The OH-58A light observation helicopter was flight
t~st~n

by

Alabam~

to

t~e

U.S. Army Aviation Test Board, Fort Rucker,

durina the period June, 1969 through April, 1970

det~rmin~

reliability and maintainability.

OH-58A aircraft were used for the test.

Three

During the test,

aircraft #1 accumulated 1200 hours of controlled flight
time, using profiles which had been developed by the
u.s. Army Combat Developments Command Aviation Agency
as beinq representative of fleet operations.

Aircraft

#2 accumulated 410 flight hours of operational suitability testing,
hOUTS while
~ccident

Aircraft #3 accumulated 217 flight

b~lna

evaluated by the Board for Aviation

Research and by the Laboratory for Aeromedical

Research.

Flight Test Results
A detailed Automated Data Process (ADP) record was
kept throughout the test on all operational and maintainability data generated by the three aircraft.
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and components, by subsystem (Aircraft, Armament or Avionics),
o~

r~placed

durinq the test were recorded.

Cause

fel1ure of items replacpd waR analyzed to identify
Darts, comoonents, and component accessories

tho~p.

TPquirinq a product improvement program.
Ther~
requiT~
itpm~,

are 19 major items on an OM-SeA aircraft that

historical data be kept on them.

From these 19

the five havlnq the highest cost of overhaul were

selected as a basis for checking out the validity of the
proposed forecastinq theory.

They are:

a) Turbine Engine, T63-A-700, FSN 2840-179-5536 .
Six enqinp.s were used during the test.

which accumulated 1200 fliqht hOUTs!
re~ov~d

On the aircraft

Engine #1 was

at 302.4 hours, Engine #2 failed at 450 hours,

Encrine #3 failpd at 95.7 hours, Engine #4 accumulated

351.9 houTR by the end of the test and was still operatinq.
th~

~iTcraft

1~stal1pd

#2 and #3 completed their tests with

~noines.

Mean operatinq time was 304.5

hours, with a standard deviation of 17.45 hours.

h)

Tr~nsmission

1615-121-6543.
test .
hours.

Assembly, PIN 206-040-003-5, FSN

Four transmissions were used during the

One transmission failed during test at 1159.6
By the end of test, the three remaining trans-

missions had accumulated 40.4, 410, and 217 hours.

Mean

opprating time was 456.75 hours, with a standard deviation of 21.37 hours.
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c) Axial Compressor, PIN 687439, FSN 2840-179-7023.
One axial compressor accumulated 1200 hours during the
test.

One compressor failed at 269.0 hours and was

removed because of excessive vibration.

The two com-

pressors on the aircraft at testis end had accumulated

141.0 and 217.1 hours.

Mean operatinq time was 456.75

hours, with a standard deviation of 21.37 hours.

d) Main-Potor Hub, pIN 206-011-100-1, FSN 1615-1254061.

One main-rotor hub attained TBO life of 1200 hours

durinq

th~

test.

The two main-rotor hubs still installed

at the end of test had 410 and 217 hours.

Mean operating

time was 609 hours, with a standard deviation of 24.68
hours.

e) Swashp1ate and Support PIN 206-010-450-5, FSN
1615-120-0482.

One swashp1ate and

~upport

accumulated

1200 hours during the test and was removed for having

attained TBO life.

The two assemblies still installed

at end of test had accumulated 410 and 217 hours.
operatina time

~s

Mean

609 hours, with a standard deviation

of 24.68 hours.
Table 5 is a summary of the results derived from
th~

service test of the

OH-5~

type aircraft.
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TABLE 5
OH-5AA MAJOR COMPONFNTS

FLIGHT TEST DATA
Averaqe

Operatinq
TBO

Comoonp.nt

Hours

EnQinp

1200 hours

304.5 hours

TranArniseion

1200 hours

456.75 hours

Axial Compressor

1200 hours

456.75 hours

Main-Rotor Hub

1200 hours

609.00 hours

Swashplate and Support

1200 hours

609.00 hours

Forecasting Pactors for OH-58A Aircraft

Major Dynamic Components
Based on the data qenerated during the service test,

factors were derived which can be used to forecast the
r~qu1rements
~1rcra~t

for the replacement of certain

~ynam1c

components.

OH-5~

type

The results o f the service

test discusspd in Table 5 indicated that the five dynamic
compon~nts

selpcted experienced a mean operating time

which pOints out the probability that the usage rate of
thesp items may be relatively high.

Using the mean

operatlnq time as a baSiS, a usage factor for the engine
and the four major dynamic components

is shown in Table 6.

wa~

calculated and
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'rABL,
OH-58A MAJOR COMPONENTS

6
FLIGHT TEST USAG E RATE

Averaqe
Hours

Usaae Factor I
Flight Hour

Engine

304.5 hours

0.003284

Transmission

45 6 .75 hours

0.002189

Axial Compressor

456.75 hours

0.002189

Main-Potor Hub

609.00 hours

0.001642

Swasholate and Support

609.00 hours

0.001642

Operating
Component

Fleet Operation Data -- OH-58A Helicopter
The fleet operations data contained in U.S. Army
Aviation

~ystems

Command Technical Report 75-34, titled

"Executive Summary Report, OH-SeA Fleet Assessment,

dated September,

II

1975, was used as a basis for deter-

mininq the usaqe factors
atinq OH-58A aircraft.

actu~lly

experienced in oper-

This report contains information

on the support requirements of the OH-58A fleet from
October 1, 1969 to May 31, 1974.

The size of the fleet

at the end of the data period was 2082 aircraft.

The

average age of the OH-58A fleet on June 20, 1975 was 3
years, 8 months, with approximately 50 aircraft less than

2 years old and with 10 aircraft more than 6 years old.
The average aircraft in the fleet on June 20, 1975 had
accumul.ted

7~0

flight hours, this

.

includ~d

220 aircraft

with less than 300 hours and an aircraft with 4200 hours •
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OH-58A Fleet Logistical

Require~ents

An analysis of field operatlnq costs showed that

during the period July, 1970 through June, 1972, the
cost
was

~r

flight hour to operate an OH-5 8A helicopter

~98.91.

Parts consumption accounted for $74.53 of

the total cost.

The average number of flight hours per

Rircraft per month durinq the period July,
1975 was

l~.O

hours.

The aporox1mate cost

for one ypar was $12,525.00 per aircraft.

1974 to June,
fOT

parts

The total

cost ner fl1qht hour for the five components listed 1n

Table 6 was $46.30.

Usage factors based on fleet

experience were well established at the time of the
r~port.

ThP mean time to removal because of failure

had stabilized, and any major changes in the future
would be lnvestiqated to determine exact cause, or
cause5.

Util~zing

the average operating hours at

removal as a basis, a usage factor for each of the
five OR-SeA components previously listed was calcu-

lated and is shown in Table 7.
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TIIBLE 7
OH-581\ MAJOR COMPONENTS

FLEET USAG E RIITE

Frequency of
Replacement

Usage Factor I
Flight Hour

Encrine

318.1 hours

0.003144

Transmission

571.0 hours

0.001751

Axial Compressor

491.4 hours

0.002035

Mi=\in-Rotor Hub

365.7 hours

0.002734

Swashplate and Support

637.1 hours

0.001570

Component

Comparison of Usage Rates and Check

of Test Data Validity
The usage rates based on the accelerated service
test data was compared with the actual usage rate expe rienced durina prolonq fleet operation.

The results of

that comparison were as follows:

a) Engine T63-A-700, FSN 2840-179-5536.

The usage

rate for enqines ouring the accelerated test was 0.003284
and the usaae rate establ1shp.d by fleet operation had

stabilized at 0.003144 per flight hour, with nF
The rate

e~peT1enced

= 4975.

during fleet operations was only

reduced by 4.3 percent from the usage rate predicted by
the data from the accelerated flight test.

A t statistic

for the engine was calculated to be -1.03 with 6 degrees
of freedom indicat1nq a confidence level of O.83r therefore the null hypothesis that accelerated test data is
r~presentativ~

of fleet operatinq experience is not valid.
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b) Transmission Assembly, PIN 206-040-003, FSN 1615121-6543.

The main transmission durinq the accelerated

test had a usaqe rate of 0.002189 per flight hour.

The

fleet experienced a usage rate of 0.001760 per flight
hour with n F

= 2771.

The usage rate experienced by the

fleet is almost a 20 percent reduction from that achieved
durinq the accelerated test.

An analysis of the accele-

rated test data indicated that one transmission accumulated only 40 hours when the test was completed and was
not overhauled as a test samp1p.
d ~t~

were removed from the

If this transmission's

acceler~ted

test data, the

mpan operatinq time for transmissions durina the acce1erat~d

tests becomes 595.5 hours and the usage rate for

thp test becomes 0.001679 per flight hour, which is only
4.6 percent less than that experienced by the fleet.
Usina data list above, calculations produced a t

statis-

tic for the transmission of -3.41 with 4 degrees of freedom, which g ives a confidence level of 0.98: therefore,
test data 1s considered verified.
c) Axial Compressor, PIN 688439, FSN 2340-179-7023.
The usage rate for axial compressors durina the accelerated tests was 0.002189 per fliqht hour, whereas the
USAap rate experienced by the fleet stabilized at
0.002035, with nF = 3220.

The fleet usaqe rate 1s a

7 percpnt reduction from the rate that was achieved

.

durina thp accelerated test.

Calculations of a t
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8t8tistic for the axial compressor produced t = -0.65
with 4 degrees of freedom,

indicating a confidence level

of 0.73, which is below the minimum acceptable of 0.90.
Null hypothesis is rejected.
d) Main-Rotor Hub, PIN 206-011-100-1, FSN 1615-1254051.

The usaqp. rate for main-rotor hubs experienced by

the operatinq fleet stabilized at 0.002734 per flight
hour, with nF = 4327.
accel~rated

~licrht

The usaqe rate predicted by the

test was 0.001642 per flight hour.

careful analysis of th e

maint~nance

A

record for the main-

rotor hub which reached its TBO life of 1200 hours flight
time reveals that maintenance to correct leaking seals
was accomplished 10 times during the 1200-hour test.
Operatinq fleet data reveals the primary cause for
replacement of main-rotor hubs prior to reachinq TBO

life is

l~akinq

seals.

It appears that the accelerated

test data was an accurate predictor of the leaking seal
problem, but not a very acod oredlctor of maintenance
unit's acceptance Of a continuous maintenance problem.
Test was not an anequate basis for usage forecasting

due to the inability to dete rmine how many times an item
will be repaired before it is returned for overhaul.

Data not considered valid.

e) Swashp1ate and Support PIN 206-010-450-5, FSN
1615-120-0482.

The usage rate for swashp1ate and support

during accelerated test was 0.001642 per flight hour,
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whereas during operations hy the fleet, the usage rate
decreasen to 0.001570, with n F = 2484.

There is a reduc-

tion of 4.4 percent from that predicted by the acceleraten test data.

A confidence level for swashplate and

support was calculated to be 0.87, with t statistic of
-1.42 with 3 degrees of freedom.

Null hypothesis is

accppted.
A summary of the comparison of selected OH-5eA
dynamic components' usage rates during fleet operations
and the

acc~lerated

tests are shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8
OR-5eA MAJOR COMPONENTS -- USAGE RATE COMPARISON
Component

Test Usaqe
Rate

Fleet Usage
Rate
Difference

Engine

0.003284

0.003144

-4.3%

Transmission

0.001679

0.001700

+4.8%

Axial Compressor

0.002189

0.002035

-7.9%

Main-Rotor Hub

0.001642

0.002734

+66.5%*

Swashp1ate and Support

0.001642

0.001570

-4.4%

*Compari Bon is not valid for reasons discussed above.
The comparison of accelerated test data with fleet
operation data shows a high degree of correlation: however, only one valid sample attained the 0.90 confidence
level.

Confidence levels of three other valid samples

were 0.87, 0.83, ann 0.73 respectively.

•

CHAPTER IV
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Discussion
As noted earlier, the objective of this research

was to

det~rmin~

th~

validity of usinq

acc~lerated

flight

test data as a basis for forecasting requirements of aircraft components durinq the time interval between introduction of a new military aircraft and the time when
fl~et

operations have stabilized.

Logistical

for~casts

for new aircraft are initially very difficult to make
and, since few new aircraft are truly oriqinal, such
forecasts in the past have been based on experience with

a similar product.

This approach has been plagued with

errors, esoecial1y with the advancement of technology,
cr~atinq

a detrimental effect on the new aircraft's

initial operational capability.
For new aircraft, an estimate of the forecastlna

error is
ba~e

for

~ssential.

Within this context the proposal to

initial forecasting requirements of repair parts
n~w

military aircraft on accelerated flight test

data was evaluated.

These evaluations were made by

determining the forecasting error that would have existed
38
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had the accelerated fliqht data been used.

The items

selected for this comparison were the hiqh cost, overhaulable
factors:

co~ponentsr

their selection was based on two

(1) usaae data was

r~ad11y ava11abl~,

both

from the accelerated flight tests and from fleet operations, and (2) the components selected typically reoresented approximately 60 percent of the cost of repair
parts for each of the aircraft systems.

A comparison of field and test data showed the
initial forecasting error for the selected repair components for UH-l type aircraft would have varied from a low

of less than 4 percent for 4 items to a high of 25 percent

~or

on~

cent

w~s

exoerienced by those components that remained

itemr however, no error greater than 10 per-

essentially as tested during the accelerated flight test.
While dat. is not available on the exoected initial usage
rates furnished by the manufacturer for all of these components, thp. exoected initial usage rate furnished for
the engine underestimated the actual usaae rate by more
than 66 percent.

Three components which experienced 11,

15, and 25 percent decreases in usage rates since the

accelerated fliqht tests were redesigned during PIP and
are, therefore, no longer the same parts that were originallv

tP~ted.

Evaluation of valid UH-I samples reveals

that 75 percent have justified a conclusion to accept the

null hvpothesis.
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Th~

initial forecastina error for components of the

OH-5RA was similarly evaluated, and the error was founo

than 5 Dp.rcent for 4 samples, with a confi-

to bp.

les~

oenc p

levpl of above 0.90 for only one.

did not satisfy the hypothesis test.
level

Sample with lowest

foreca~tinq

confidencp (0.72) had a

Of

Three components

error of 7

D~rcent.

Accordinqly, analysis of accelerated flight test
data indicates that as few as three samples would provide
~

reasonable basis for calculatlnq field usaqe.

Also,

in order to assure that accelerated flight tests provide
a minimum of three samples of any component which fails,
the tp.sts should be conducted on two aircraft throuqh a

comolete TBO cycle.

To do

thi~

would

samDl~R

of those componentR which

rates.

For

exampl~,

1n this study.

g~nerate

exp~rlence

many more

hiah usaqe

consider the two aircraft analyzed

If two aircraft of each

tyP~

had been

tpstpd throuah a complp.te enqine TeO cycle, the tests
would have produced 7 or 8 enqine samples for each type
aircraft.

This would have increased the level of confi-

dence.

Further justification of the use of accelerated
flight test data as a basis for forecasting fleet
requirements of aircraft components was established
by a test which evaluated that the MTBF of the components in the tests was an unbiased estimator of those
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experlenc~d

1n the flep.t.

Rp.sults of this test are shown

in Table 9.

T.ABLE 9

XT as Unbiased Example of XF
Test Results
Component

Engine

3&0.5

3&&.7

1.02

Transmission

&47. &

550.0

0.85*

90-deare~

Gearbox

471.1

355.0

0.75*

42-deqree Gearbox

5&8.2

550.0

0.97

Rotor Hub

371.4

3&&.7

0.99

Scissors and Sleeve

&49.8

579.&

0.89*

Driv" Shaft

274.2

275.0

1.00

Enqine

318.1

304.5

0.9&

Transmission

571.0

595.5

1.04

Axial Compressor

491.4

45&.75

0.93

Rotor Hub

3&5.7

&09.0

1.&7*

Swashplate and Support

&37.1

609.0

0.96
7.87

*Not valid.
r

=
n

R~sults

7.87 = 0.98
8

of bias test (r) fall well within the estab-

11shed ranqe of 0.95 -- 1.05, for a confidence level of

0.90 that the accelerated tests did not produce biased
results.
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Conclusions and Recommendations

The failure data qenerated durinq accelerated fliqht
tests can be used to forecast the field loaistical requiT~mpnts

ablp

l~vels

~OT

new

alrcra~t

of confidence.

within statistically accept-

This hypothesis was statisti-

cally validated at the 0.20 level of significance.
The evaluation analysis also supports the conclusion

that the forecastinq error associated with the use of

military aircraft accelerated flight test data as a basis
for loaistical forecastinq should be 10 pprcent or less.
A minimum of 2 aircraft should be subjected to accelerated fliqht testing throuqh one comolete TBO cycle in
order to aenerate an adequate basis for loaistical plan-

ninc.

Due to the hlqh level of quality control exercised

durina the

m~nufacture

sa~ol~s

thTPe

of aircraft components, as few

a~

arp adequate to indicate failure trends.

The implementation of the proposed forecastlnq
~~thod

would crovlde loqistical planners with more accu-

rate data upon which to base procurement of repair parts

and the schedulina of overhaul facilities as much as 9
months earlier than the current system, thereby eliminat-

inq many costly proqram changes.

With an improved supply

proaram, the fleet will attain a high operational readiness level much earlier than can be achieved usinq the
pres~nt
ment~.

method of forecastinq loqistical support require-
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It is recommended that future accelerated fli g ht
testino of military aircraft to determine operational

reliability and maintainability characteristics be conducted on a minimum of two aircraft under highly con-

trolled conditions.
It is also recommended that following completion of
accelerated flight tests, immediate action be taken to

base logistical requirements on test data until modified
by fleet experience.
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